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Abstract
The Bisq DAO is a core component of Bisq, a decentralized cryp-
tocurrency exchange. The purpose of the Bisq DAO is to decentralize
the governance and finance functions of the exchange. However, by in-
teracting with the Bisq DAO, participants necessarily publish data to the
Bitcoin blockchain and broadcast additional data to the Bisq peer-to-peer
network. We examine the privacy cost to participants in sharing this
data. Specifically, we use a novel address clustering heuristic to construct
the one-to-many mappings from participants to addresses on the Bitcoin
blockchain and augment the address clusters with data stored within the
Bisq peer-to-peer network. We show that this technique aggregates ac-
tivity performed by each participant: trading, voting, transfers, etc. We
identify instances where participants are operating under multiple aliases,
some of which are real-world names. We identify the dominant transac-
tors and their role in a two-sided market. We conclude with suggestions
to better protect the privacy of participants in the future.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin and its altcoin brethren, with the notable exception of “privacy coins”,
seek decentralization first and privacy second [10]. The synergistic pairing of
blockchain analysis service providers with regulated cryptocurrency exchanges
has exploited this. The former perform blockchain-wide analyses for high cov-
erage but low individual identification. The latter enforce identity checkpoints
for high individual identification but low coverage. Their pairing, combining
aggregation with identification, is an example of a well-known privacy-risk [20].
Bisq is a decentralized cryptocurrency exchange that does not enforce iden-
tity checkpoints but relies on the Bitcoin blockchain and its own peer-to-peer
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network to operate; thereby falling under the purview of blockchain analysis
service providers rather than regulators. In this paper we analyse the Bisq
DAO, the component of Bisq responsible for decentralizing its governance and
finance functions, from a privacy perspective. We contend that there is a pri-
vacy cost to participating in the Bisq DAO and its extent may be unexpected
by participants.
Specifically, our analysis applies address clustering with a Bisq DAO-specific
heuristic. Address clustering is a cornerstone of blockchain analysis. It employs
heuristics to partition the set of addresses observed on a blockchain into address
clusters that are likely controlled by the same participant. When combined with
address tagging, or associating real-world identities with addresses, and graph
analysis, it is an effective means of analysing blockchain activity at both the
micro- and macro-levels, see, e.g., [16, 11]. The Bisq DAO relies on a colored-
coin issued on the Bitcoin blockchain known as the BSQ token and is subject
to this form of analysis. We utilise the properties of BSQ token transactions in
the creation of a Bisq DAO-specific address clustering heuristic.
This paper reviews related work (Sect. 2); introduces Bisq, the Bisq DAO
and our Bisq DAO-specific address clustering heuristic (Sect. 3); details our
analysis and results (Sect. 4); and concludes with suggestions to defeat the
heuristic in the future (Sect. 5).
2 Related Work
We categorise related work into four areas: address clustering, token analysis,
transaction analysis and decentralized exchanges.
Address clustering is a fundamental building block upon which many high-
level blockchain analyses can be performed, see, e.g. [16, 14, 9, 7, 8, 15, 11, 12].
Recently, specialized approaches for sharing address tags [5], crowd-sourcing the
classification of transactions [25] and developing address clustering heuristics for
the Ethereum blockchain [23] have extended this line of research.
We use address clustering to track the BSQ token, a colored-coin issued
on the Bitcoin blockchain by the Bisq project. Tokens are a form of “digital
voucher” that provide access to a service or asset while providing revenue or
funding to token-based business models [22]. There are several network analyses
of ERC20 tokens on the Ethereum blockchain that analyse their age, economic
value, activity volume, etc. [21, 24].
Additionally, specialized heuristics have proved successful in tracing trans-
actions in “privacy coin” blockchains. For example, heuristics have been used
to link public addresses on either side of Zcash shielded transactions [19] and
to identify the true transaction inputs in Monero RingCTs (Ring Confidential
Transactions) [17].
Decentralized exchanges enable traders to exchange cryptocurrencies and/or
fiat currencies without having to trust a centralized entity to act as an in-
termediary for the exchange or as a custodian for the currencies. However,
decentralized exchanges vary widely in terms of technology, trustlessness and
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security [13]. Bisq is an example of a decentralized exchange. It goes to great
lengths to decentralize all aspects of its operation. The Bisq DAO is an attempt
to decentralize its governance and finance functions.
Decentralized exchanges are a focus of the DeFi, or Decentralized Finance,
community. The DeFi movement encompasses several projects that aim to
extend the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies to other areas of modern
finance. These projects typically take the form of DApps, or Decentralized Apps,
that operate using smart contracts. There are several decentralized exchange
DApps within the DeFi movement, such as Uniswap1, Kyber2 and Bancor.3
These decentralized exchange DApps facilitate the exchange of ERC20 tokens
using methods such as community powered liquidity pools or order book based
protocols. While these decentralized exchanges differ somewhat in terms of func-
tionality, the Uniswap whitepapers serve as an effective outline of how liquidity
pool based exchanges operate on the Ethereum blockchain [2, 3].
We use common terminology from graph theory through-out the paper.
Please refer to [6] or a similar reference for definitions.
3 Bisq, The Bisq DAO and Address Clustering
The following is a simplified description of Bisq and the Bisq DAO; see [1]
for a more thorough treatment. Bisq, formerly known as Bitsquare, is a de-
centralized exchange that enables traders to exchange bitcoins for altcoins and
fiat currencies without enforcing identity checkpoints. Bisq nodes connect to a
peer-to-peer network over Tor to create an order book, coordinate trades and
resolve disputes. Trades require security deposits that are held using Bitcoin
multi-signature transactions to deter fraud. At the time of writing, traders have
completed over 60 000 trades using Bisq.
3.1 The Bisq DAO
There are two types of participant in the Bisq ecosystem: those who use Bisq
solely as a decentralized trading platform and those who take part in the devel-
opment, operation and governance of Bisq. The Bisq DAO, or Bisq decentralized
autonomous organisation, is the vehicle through which the latter group manages
the governance and finance functions of Bisq in a decentralized fashion [4]. Par-
ticipants in the Bisq DAO can make and vote upon proposals relating to Bisq
using a stake based voting system, with voting taking place in approximately
monthly cycles known as DAO cycles. The DAO cycle times are determined by
block heights on the Bitcoin blockchain. The former group may also participate
in the Bisq DAO to a lesser extent by acquiring and burning BSQ tokens in lieu
of trading fees.
1https://uniswap.org
2https://kyber.network
3https://www.bancor.network
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3.2 The BSQ Colored-Coin
The Bisq DAO operates by tracking and interpreting the issuance and actions
of a token or colored-coin issued on the Bitcoin blockchain (BSQ). Participants
of the Bisq DAO must first hold some BSQ in order to make and vote upon
proposals. There is a two-sided market for BSQ. On the supply side, BSQ can
be acquired in several ways. BSQ was minted and distributed in a genesis trans-
action on 15th April 2019. Additionally, new BSQ is minted and distributed in
DAO cycles to contributors using the proposal and stake based voting system.
BSQ can also be traded between parties in much the same way as non-colored
bitcoin using transfer transactions. On the demand side, traders using Bisq
can opt to pay trade fees at a reduced rate by acquiring and burning BSQ,
thereby increasing the demand for BSQ and rewarding contributors indirectly.
In this way, BSQ is used to financially reward contributors as well as manage
the operations of the Bisq DAO itself.
Every action on the Bisq DAO, such as a proposal or vote, takes the form
of a BSQ transaction. There are twelve transaction types:
1. Trade fee transactions pay Bisq trade fees at a reduced rate using BSQ.
The reduced rate incentivises users trading on Bisq to pay using BSQ
rather than bitcoin, thereby creating a demand for BSQ.
2. Transfer transactions transfer BSQ between addresses in much the same
way as non-colored bitcoin.
3. Compensation request transactions request BSQ compensation for con-
tributions to the Bisq project. Users supply non-colored Bitcoin that will
be converted into BSQ should the request be accepted by vote.
4. Reimbursement request transactions are functionally similar to com-
pensation requests. They reimburse users for out-of-pocket expenses re-
lating to Bisq or compensate users for failed trades.
5. Proposal transactions make proposals that are neither compensation nor
reimbursement requests. The acceptance of these proposals is determined
by vote.
6. Blind vote transactions vote on open requests and proposals during the
blind vote stage of a DAO cycle.
7. Vote reveal transactions publish unblinded votes during the vote reveal
stage of a DAO cycle.
8. Lockup transactions lock BSQ for a specified duration. They are often
used as a bond for a specified role in Bisq such as a trade mediator or
arbitrator.
9. Unlock transactions unlock previously locked BSQ.
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Table 1: The twelve valid BSQ transaction types, their counts and whether or
not they are self-tranfers.
Count Self-Transfer?
Trade Fee 27 285 3
Transfer 2095 7
Compensation Request 269 3
Blind Vote 239 3
Vote Reveal 236 3
Proposal 87 3
Lockup 39 3
Asset Listing Fee 22 3
Proof of Burn 22 3
Unlock 11 3
Reimbursement Request 5 3
Genesis 1 7
10. Asset listing fee transactions list new tradeable assets on Bisq, such as
a new altcoin.
11. Proof of burn transactions destroy BSQ. They do not have a specific use
case but can be used as a form of reputation by proving that an individual
burned BSQ.
12. The Genesis transaction was the initial transaction that minted and dis-
tributed the initial quantity of BSQ.
3.3 The Self-Transfer Issue & the Address Clustering Heuris-
tic
Due to the Bisq DAO’s reliance on the BSQ token, a significant amount of
DAO related activity is published to the Bitcoin blockchain. Bisq attempts
to limit the extent to which any activity can be linked to users by generating
new address(es) for each transaction. However, Bisq-DAO specific information
can aid in this regard. While Bisq generates new address(es) for each BSQ
transaction, the majority of these transactions are actually self-transfers, i.e., the
same participant owns all of the addresses associated with all of the transaction
inputs and outputs. In the list of twelve transaction types above, all but the
transfer transactions and the genesis transaction are self-transfers. This points
to our Bisq DAO-specific address clustering heuristic: for each self-transfer BSQ
transaction, the addresses referenced by all of its transaction inputs and all of
its transaction outputs belong to the same participant; for each BSQ transfer
transaction, the addresses referenced by all of its transaction inputs and all but
the first of its transaction outputs belong to the same participant. Only the
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address referenced by the first transaction output in a BSQ transfer transaction
belongs to the recipient rather than the sender. The self-transfer issue allows
the addresses referenced at either side of these transactions to be clustered. The
prevalence of self-transfer transactions compounds this issue as only the BSQ
genesis transaction and transfer transactions are not necessarily self-transfers.
We have specified a heuristic by which the addresses associated with BSQ
transactions can be clustered. This is a heuristic because it is possible for a
participant to manually construct a BSQ transaction that violates these as-
sumptions. However, it is not supported by the Bisq software, e.g., the only
way to transfer BSQ is to create a BSQ transfer transaction. We implemented
this heuristic; the analysis and results are detailed in the next section.
In this paper we analyse all 30 313 BSQ transactions as of Bitcoin block
height 627 911 after the completion of Bisq DAO Cycle 12 on 27th April 2020.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the BSQ transaction types, excluding two
irregular transactions. We note that 90% of the transactions burn BSQ for
trade fees and 93% are self-transfers: participants burn BSQ and/or signal an
action to the Bisq DAO (submitting proposals, voting, locking BSQ, etc.), but
the remaining BSQ and underlying bitcoin are returned to the same participant.
4 Analysis and Results
The transaction inputs and outputs of the 30 313 BSQ transactions reference
109 719 distinct addresses.4 The address clustering heuristic produces 1027 ad-
dress clusters. That is, it partitions the 109 719 addresses into 1027 subsets such
that all addresses in the same subset are likely controlled by the same partici-
pant. Generally, it is difficult to assess the validity of an address clustering due
to the unavailability of a ground truth [18]. However, the Bisq DAO offers the
following partial solution. We assign a role to each address cluster:
1. If an address cluster contains at least one address referenced by a trans-
action output of a BSQ proposal transaction, we assign it the proposer
role.
2. If an address cluster is not a proposer but it contains at least one address
referenced by a transaction output of the BSQ genesis transaction, we
assign it the generator role.
3. If an address cluster is neither a proposer nor a generator, we assign it the
user role.
4.1 Address Tagging
There are 775 users, 178 generators and 74 proposers. The roles are significant
because we can assign tags, or links to pseudonyms and real-world identities, to
4Our number differs from that shown on the BSQ Block Explorer (https://explorer.
bisq.network) since our number includes addresses not carrying BSQ-colored bitcoins.
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all of the proposers using data stored by the Bisq DAO for the BSQ compen-
sation, reimbursement and proposal transactions. Furthermore, we can assign
tags to many of the generators using GitHub account usernames associated with
transaction outputs of the BSQ genesis transaction.
Prior to the launch of the Bisq DAO and the BSQ colored-coin, the Bisq com-
munity performed the operations of the Bisq DAO and managed the issuance
and circulation of prototypical BSQ colored-coins manually and centrally. Dur-
ing this bootstrapping phase, the Bisq community tracked voting and stakes us-
ing a spreadsheet.5 Additionally, contributors creating compensation requests
at this time stated the BSQ address to which compensation should be directed
in the request’s associated GitHub issue. Using the addresses found in both the
spreadsheet and within the issues found on GitHub, we created a pre-launch
BSQ tag database.
The Bisq DAO was launched on the 15th April 2019. BSQ holders were
given the opportunity to specify the address they wished to use in the BSQ
genesis transaction. They could take one of three actions: retain their pre-launch
address; publicly announce a new address or change their address privately by
notifying the individual(s) who constructed the genesis transaction. For each of
these cases, we can create a mapping from pre-launch addresses to post-launch
addresses, thus creating a post-launch tag database for addresses referenced
by the BSQ genesis transaction. Creating a mapping for the first two cases is
trivial as addresses are publicly stated on GitHub.6 However, we were also able
to ascertain post-launch addresses for those who chose to change their addresses
privately. We found that the ordering of the transaction outputs of the BSQ
genesis transaction matched the ordering of the entries in the spreadsheet.
Together, we can assign tags to 96 distinct address clusters. We stress that
assigning tags to individual addresses is trivial; the information is publicly avail-
able and released by the proposers and generators. However, we are assigning
tags to entire address clusters generated using our Bisq DAO-specific heuristic
and all of their constituent activity, e.g., trading, voting, transfers, etc.
Returning to the question of validity, we inspected the tags assigned to
each address cluster. Out of the 96 tagged address clusters, we identified four
with conflicting tags: four address clusters were assigned multiple tags that,
ignoring obvious capitalization and spelling errors, were not the same. This
could be an indication of false positives generated by our address clustering
heuristic. However, on further inspection, we observe that one case contains
three different pseudonyms who submitted three different BSQ compensation
proposal transactions for overlapping translation contributions. In the other
three cases we observe real-world names combined with pseudonyms. We don’t
believe these are false positives but evidence of participants operating under
multiple aliases. The privacy risk is stark.
Additionally, there are nine shared tags: several address clusters were as-
signed tags that were identical to tags assigned to other address clusters. These
5https://long.af/kcaift
6https://github.com/bisq-network/compensation/issues/260
https://github.com/bisq-network/compensation/issues/263
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are false negatives generated by our address clustering heuristic. They may be
due to participants managing multiple Bisq nodes with distinct BSQ wallets or
migrating between BSQ wallets using BSQ transfer transactions. We use the
shared tags to reduce the number of address clusters to 1015 and the number
of tagged clusters to 84. In the context of address clustering, a false negative
is less serious than a false positive: assuming that two address clusters may be
controlled by two separate participants when in fact they are controlled by one
is a lack of information whereas assuming that one address cluster is controlled
by one participant when in fact it is controlled by more than one is incorrect
information.
4.2 The Address Cluster Graph
Once we have generated the address clusters, we can perform higher-level anal-
yses of activity within the Bisq DAO. We can construct an address cluster graph
where each vertex corresponds to an address cluster or Bisq DAO participant
and each edge corresponds to a set of BSQ transfer transactions where the source
and target vertices represent the sender and recipient of the transactions, re-
spectively. Figure 1 is a visualization of the largest connected component of the
address cluster graph where the total value of the transactions associated with
each edge exceeds 3000 BSQ. This is an arbitrary value chosen to produce a
graph whose size is suitable for this paper; an interactive graph visualization
system is required to navigate the entire graph.
The color of each vertex represents the role of the corresponding address
cluster: red vertices are proposers; blue vertices are generators and white ver-
tices are users. The size of each vertex is proportional to the total amount of
BSQ sent to the addresses in the corresponding address cluster. We note that
all of the red vertices and three out of the eight blue vertices can be linked with
pseudonyms, GitHub account names, and/or real-world names. The address
cluster graph represents a financial network where the vertices represent Bisq
DAO participants, many of which are identifiable, and the edges represent fi-
nancial relationships. This is a privacy risk since it implies the applicability of
a multitude of financial network analysis techniques.
4.3 The Two-Sided BSQ Market
All BSQ originates with contributors of the Bisq project in either the transaction
outputs of the BSQ genesis transaction or the issuance transaction outputs of
the accepted BSQ compensation and reimbursement request transactions. Once
minted, BSQ can be transferred between any number of participants until it is
eventually burnt, primarily by traders for trading fees. We can use the address
cluster graph to classify the BSQ transfer transactions based on the roles of
the sender (the source address cluster) and the recipient (the target address
cluster). The breakdown for the 2095 BSQ transfer transactions (see Table 1) is
971 transfers from proposers and generators to users, 621 transfers from users to
users, 350 transfers from proposers and generators to proposers and generators,
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Figure 1: A graphical summary of the significant flows of BSQ between address
clusters (Bisq DAO participants). Vertex color indicates role (red for proposers,
blue for generators, and white for users) while vertex size indicates transaction
volume; see the text for the full details.
and 153 transfers from users to proposers and generators. Although there are
far fewer proposers and generators than users, the proposers and generators are
involved in 70% of all BSQ transfer transactions.
A similar situation presents itself in Bitcoin: large centralized services such
as exchanges, mining pools, gambling services and darknet markets generate
‘super-clusters’ in the address clustering of the Bitcoin blockchain [9]. Even
though they are few in number when compared with the total number of Bitcoin
users, they have high degree centrality in their corresponding address cluster
graph and are involved in a significant number of Bitcoin transactions [14].
Because of this they are a focus of regulators and blockchain analysis service
providers. Within Bisq, the proposers and generators could attract a similar
focus: they are involved in a significant number of BSQ transfer transactions,
they play a central role in the network and, in many cases, they are easily
identifiable.
4.4 The Dominant BSQ Transactors
At the time of our analysis, the Bisq DAO had minted 4 529 424.22 BSQ, the par-
ticipants had burnt 681 210.40 BSQ, primarily for trade fees, and 3 848 213.82 BSQ
remained in circulation. It is an easy task to identify the address clusters that
have transacted the most BSQ. Out of the top ten BSQ transactors, five can be
linked with GitHub account names and real-world names. The individuals are
providing their names when submitting BSQ compensation and reimbursement
proposal transactions. Our address clustering heuristic is linking this informa-
tion with the entirety of their Bisq DAO activity including their transaction
volume and balances.
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4.5 Impact Within the Bitcoin Blockchain
Thus far, we have assessed the Bisq DAO and BSQ token in isolation. However,
all BSQ transaction data is published to the Bitcoin blockchain. The set of BSQ
transactions is, by definition, a subset of the set of Bitcoin transactions. We can
assess the impact of the Bisq DAO on address clusterings of the entire Bitcoin
blockchain.
The address clusters generated by our heuristic are equally valid when viewed
through the lens of the larger Bitcoin blockchain. By extension, the observations
stemming from the use of this heuristic are equally applicable. Since the results
of the Bisq DAO-specific clustering heuristic can be extended to the Bitcoin
blockchain, a comparison between our heuristic and conventional blockchain
clustering heuristics can be made.
Initially, we intended to merge the results of both clustering heuristics to
refine the resultant address clusters. However, we found that when the address
clusters generated by both heuristics were merged, they produced large clusters
with many false positives. We believe this is due to CoinJoin transactions
involving bitcoin that was later colored as BSQ.
5 Conclusion
We demonstrated the privacy cost in participating in the Bisq DAO. Specifi-
cally, we showed that participants may be revealing more information than they
intend, especially when submitting BSQ compensation and reimbursement pro-
posal transactions. Even though Bisq generates new address(es) for every BSQ
transaction, 93% of these transactions are self-transfers, i.e., all of the trans-
action inputs and outputs belong to the same participant. This points to a
Bisq DAO-specific address clustering heuristic. We implemented this heuristic
and applied it to all BSQ transactions to date. The heuristic proves effective in
aggregating all activity performed by each participant such as trades, votes, pro-
posals, etc. We can attach pseudonyms, GitHub account names and real-world
names to many of the central participants. This has important implications for
user privacy. Although not examined in this paper, it has further implications
for the Bisq DAO voting system and address clustering in the broader Bitcoin
blockchain.
A number of approaches can be taken to defeat this heuristic. The heuristic
relies on BSQ self-transfer transactions being easily identifiable. The Bisq soft-
ware could trigger false positives or false negatives in this heuristic by introduc-
ing ambiguity into the distinction between self-transfers and non-self-transfers.
Other than the BSQ genesis transaction, transfer transactions are the only BSQ
transactions that are not entirely self-transfers. As a result, transfer transac-
tions have the effect of separating clusters generated by our heuristic. Disguis-
ing transfer transactions so that they cannot be distinguished from self-transfer
transactions would trigger false positives in the heuristic, invalidating generated
clusters. For example, a participant could create a BSQ trade fee transaction
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to transfer BSQ where the “change” was directed to the recipient and a small
amount of BSQ was burnt to satisfy the requirement of a BSQ trade fee transac-
tion. While this solution defeats the heuristic as it stands, there are other ways
in which BSQ transaction types can be deduced. Every trade fee transaction
is linked to the multi-signature transaction of a Bisq trade. Consequently, any
trade fee transaction that isn’t linked to a Bisq trade could be identified as a
disguised transfer transaction and treated as such.
Additionally, transfer transactions can be used to trigger false negatives in
our heuristic, thereby diminishing the heuristic’s effectiveness. Triggering a false
negative requires the use of ‘dummy’ transfer transactions after each self-transfer
transaction. This transfer transaction sends BSQ from the change address used
in the last self-transfer to a new address owned by the same user. This gives
the appearnce of BSQ being sent between parties, thus reducing the size of the
address clusters generated by our heuristic. While dummy transfer transactions
reduce the effectiveness of the heuristic, they also create transactions that aren’t
otherwise needed, increasing the cost for users. Of course, functionality to create
dummy transactions and a best-practices guide could be included in the Bisq
software and documentation and only used to improve privacy as required.
The Bisq DAO is an innovative approach to decentralizing the governance
and finance functions of a decentralized exchange. However, when viewed
through the prism of blockchain analysis and address clustering, it appears
vulnerable. Participants of the Bisq DAO, including traders, will expect cer-
tain limits on what is known about them and on what others can find out.
Blockchain analysis could unsettle this expectation and have a ‘chilling effect’
on adoption.
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